Private Finance, Social Responsibility, and Transitional Justice: The Case for South African Reconciliation and Development Bonds by Bradlow, Daniel D
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2007 
Private Finance, Social Responsibility, and Transitional Justice: 
The Case for South African Reconciliation and Development 
Bonds 
Daniel D. Bradlow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human 
Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
The reconciliation and development bond proJect (Project) was originally conceived as an attempt to involve the South African expatriate community in the 
process of national reconciliation that began with the end of 
apartheid. It has since evolved into a broader effort to promote 
development and reconciliation by using a creative financing 
mechanism to raise funding, from both inside and outside the 
country, for small revenue generating projects that provide jobs, 
services, and opportunities for poor and historically disadvan-
taged South Africans. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section 
describes the genesis of the Project. The second discusses the 
design of the Retail Reconciliation and Development Bonds 
(R&D Bonds). The final section highlights some issues relat-
ing to development and transitional justice that arise from the 
project. 
geneSiS oF the proJeCt
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) is an historic commission that documented the tragic his-
tory of apartheid and promoted accountability for its perpetra-
tors. Unfortunately, the TRC’s attempt at redressing the injuries 
caused by apartheid was less comprehensive: it was limited to 
an acknowledgment of the wrongs that apartheid had produced 
and to compensating those people specifically identified in 
its report as victims of state violence.1 Thus, the reconcilia-
tion work of the TRC was ultimately focused on repairing the 
relationship between the South African state and black South 
African citizens. 
The TRC did not directly seek to promote reconciliation 
between ordinary black and white South African citizens. It did 
not establish any mechanism through which individual white 
South Africans could acknowledge that they had been benefi-
ciaries of the apartheid system and, therefore, make a gesture of 
reconciliation. It also did not address the issue of how the South 
African Diaspora could contribute to reconciliation and develop-
ment in country. 
In principle, there are many forms that this gesture could 
take. Nevertheless, the history of one of the most successful 
examples — the reconciliation between Germany and Jews fol-
lowing the end of World War II — demonstrates that one key 
component of effective reconciliation is money. This is because 
money helps those who suffered under the old order establish 
a life that offers them, and their children, better opportunities 
and more dignity than they had previously.2 Money also enables 
victims to pay the psychic price involved in moving beyond 
their pain and anger and reconciling with those who previously 
oppressed or harmed them. 
The Project began as an attempt to address this unresolved 
issue of reconciliation between different groups of citizens. It 
was premised on the idea that reconciliation requires those who 
benefited from apartheid to make a meaningful gesture towards 
those who suffered under that system. Originally, the goal was 
to design an appropriate vehicle through which private citizens 
could make a meaningful contribution to the process of South 
African reconciliation. Given the poverty of many black South 
Africans and their limited access to jobs, services, and opportu-
nities, the Project planned to achieve this goal by structuring a 
* Daniel D. Bradlow is Professor of Law and Director of the 
International Legal Studies Program at American University, 
Washington College of Law.
Private Finance, Social Responsibility, and Transitional Justice:  
The Case for South African Reconciliation and Development Bonds
by Daniel D. Bradlow*
“If charities cannot 
succeed in funding  
reconciliation, the  
alternative is to appeal to 
people’s self interest and 
offer them an opportunity 
to invest in reconciliation 
and development.”
mechanism through which interested white South Africans, both 
resident in the country and expatriates, could finance projects 
that would help poor black South Africans overcome these chal-
lenges. 
In order for a mechanism to contribute effectively to South 
African reconciliation and development, it must satisfy three 
reconciliation-financing criteria. First, it must raise enough 
money to make a meaningful difference to the situation of poor 
black South Africans. Second, there must be a sufficiently large 
number of contributors to the mechanism to demonstrate a seri-
ous community-wide interest in reconciliation. Third, it must 
use the money effectively enough to give all its stakeholders 
confidence that the mechanism can make a noticeable impact on 
solving the problems caused by apartheid. 
1
Bradlow: Private Finance, Social Responsibility, and Transitional Justice:
8The most obvious vehicle for raising money for this purpose 
is a charitable entity to which individuals that wish to make 
gestures of reconciliation can donate to projects that create jobs, 
services, and opportunities for those who, historically, were 
denied access to them. In fact, such an entity was created. It 
failed because only a relatively small number of people con-
tributed to it.3 This is not to say that there are not enough white 
South Africans of goodwill who are willing to work for the 
reconciliation and development of the country. To the contrary, 
most South Africans, including most white South Africans, 
do make charitable contributions.4 This suggests that there are 
other reasons that charitable entities fail to attract donations to 
promote reconciliation. One important contributing factor is that 
many South Africans are skeptical about the ability of the exist-
ing charitable organizations to effectively address the problems 
of poverty. In other words, charitable giving to promote recon-
ciliation is unable to satisfy the third reconciliation-financing 
criterion. 
There are two ways in which such investment vehicles may 
operate — either through equity investments or debt financing. 
The first is to establish an investment fund that makes equity 
investments in qualifying projects. The attraction of equity for 
development financing is that investors do not earn a return 
on their investment until the projects generate profit. Equity 
investments, however, are problematic vehicles for promoting 
reconciliation. They can be perceived as a way for white South 
Africans to both profit from the hard work of those black South 
Africans who suffered under apartheid and to control (through 
the voting rights associated with equity) the efforts of those they 
previously oppressed.
The second option is to use debt to finance the investments. 
This has a number of attractive advantages related to develop-
ment and reconciliation. First, debt establishes a fixed term 
contractual relationship between the investor and the recipient 
of the funds. Once debtors have fully performed the agreed upon 
contractual obligations, they are both independent of the creditor 
and in a materially better condition than before the debt transac-
tion. Second, the debtor, through reliable servicing of the debt, 
can establish a credit history which should enhance its access to 
future financing. Third, if the debt arrangement is structured so 
that the borrower receives the funding on better terms than are 
available from any other available funding source, the transac-
tion can facilitate better relations between debtor and creditor, 
thereby promoting reconciliation. The extent to which debt 
financing promotes development and reconciliation depends 
largely on this last point because if the borrower perceives the 
terms of the debt to be too harsh, the debt transaction can under-
mine, rather than promote, reconciliation.
In order for debt financing to satisfy the three reconciliation-
financing criteria, the funds should be raised through an instru-
ment that both appeals to as broad a group of individuals as 
possible and raises a substantial amount of money for qualify-
ing development projects. The only instrument that meets these 
requirements is a retail bond issued on the South African domes-
tic market. In addition to appealing to South African residents, 
the instrument will also appeal to expatriates who have an inter-
est in promoting reconciliation and development in the country. 
Given the realities of distributing and servicing retail bonds, 
any attempt to use them for reconciliation and development pur-
poses must satisfy a fourth reconciliation-financing criterion — 
it must be attractive to financial institutions. Their participation 
will help convince potential investors that this is a legitimate 
financial transaction in which they can earn both a reasonable 
financial return and produce noticeable social benefits for South 
Africa and its poor. Financial institutions can also provide the 
distribution network through which the bonds are sold. 
The Project has therefore become an effort to create and 
issue a bond that is capable of meeting all four reconciliation-
financing criteria. Its proposed structure, which was developed 
after extensive consultation with all stakeholders and a range of 
technical experts, is described in the next section. 
the StruCture oF the proJeCt
The Project is currently designed to raise R1 billion5 to fund 
a range of development projects through two instruments — a 
Subordinated Instrument (SI) and a retail R&D Bond. The two 
instruments will each seek to raise R500 million for a term of 
ten years. Both the SI and the R&D Bond will be issued by the 
“The Project offers an 
opportunity to experiment 
with measuring the social 
returns generated by small 
scale revenue generating 
development projects.”
If charities cannot succeed in funding reconciliation, the 
alternative is to appeal to people’s self interest and offer them 
an opportunity to invest in reconciliation and development. This 
method of financing allows interested parties the opportunity to 
earn a real financial and social return on their investment while 
funding small scale revenue generating development projects, 
such as small and micro-enterprises or low income housing. 
These projects normally have difficulty getting financial sup-
port because they are both “too rich” and “too poor.” They are 
“too rich” for grant funding because they generate revenues that 
can be used to service a certain level of debt and they are “too 
poor” for commercial funding either because of the size of the 
project or because its rate of return is too low to be attractive to 
a commercial lender. 
These investments satisfy the three reconciliation-financing 
criteria identified above. Because they will yield a real market-
based financial return, they have the potential to attract suf-
ficient numbers of interested investors to both demonstrate 
an interest in promoting reconciliation and to fund enough 
development projects to have a meaningful impact on poverty, 
inequality, and unemployment in South Africa. Furthermore, if 
the investments meet certain financial and social standards, they 
can demonstrate that they are, in fact, contributing to the build-
ing of a better future for all South Africans. 
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Project Issuer (PI), a private non-profit, tax exempt company 
created for this purpose. The PI’s Board of Directors, which will 
include representatives of the financial institutions that invest in 
the Project, will represent all Project stakeholders, and will have 
a small staff whose job will be to manage its relations with the 
other actors in the project. 
the SuBorDinateD inStruMent (Si)
The SI will be sold to financial institutions, corporations, 
and foundations. The funds it raises will be managed by expe-
rienced fund managers who are contractually obliged to invest 
the proceeds in commercial projects that satisfy a set of agreed 
prudential, financial, social, and environmental criteria. The 
resulting income will be used to pay all operating costs for the 
PI and to help pay the interest on the R&D Bonds in the early 
years of the Project. 
The SI will offer investors the following benefits:
1. Upon maturity, purchasers will receive a lump sum payment
equal to their original investment, plus a stipulated pro rata
share of the surplus remaining after all other Project related
obligations have been satisfied.
2. The Project’s investments will entitle qualifying SI holders
to score points towards their sectoral charter obligations.6
3. A tax benefit that is available to investors under the current
law.7
4. Banks that are holders of the SI will benefit from the banking
business generated by the Bond Project.
5. The project structure will enable interested SI holders to
learn about the risks and rewards of doing business with the
small scale project funded by the retail R&D Bonds.
6. The holders will profit from the goodwill created by their
participation in the Project.
7. All SI investors will receive an annual report describing the
projects being funded by the Project and detailing the social
benefits that have accrued from these projects.
the retail r&D BonDS
The R&D Bonds will be a non-tradable debenture with a 
periodic interest payment. Bonds will be sold for R500 per 
bond and each bond will carry an interest rate equal to the rate 
offered by the Government of South Africa on its five-year 
Government Retail Bond, which at the time of writing (October 
2007) is 10.0 percent.8 The principal will be repaid at the end of 
the ten-year term of the R&D Bond. It is expected that the bond 
will be bought by those South Africans with some disposable 
income, expatriate South Africans, and friends of South Africa. 
All bondholders will receive the same annual report as the one 
given to SI investors. 
All proceeds raised through the R&D Bond will be invested 
in activities that meet the goals of the Project. The PI will be 
responsible for arranging for the investment of these funds. The 
PI itself will not directly invest the funds raised by the R&D 
Bond, instead it will enter into contractual arrangements with 
four to six “Implementing Agencies” (IAs) that that are in the 
business of investing in the types of activities that the Project is 
designed to support. These IAs will be responsible for identify-
ing the projects to which the funds will be loaned, and for work-
ing with their sponsors to make sure they succeed and are able 
to repay their debts to the IAs. The use of 4-6 IAs will allow for 
some variety in the skills, experience and scope of operations of 
the IAs, and for some diversification of risk.9 
The contract between the IAs and the PI will include three 
sets of provisions to ensure that the Bond proceeds are only 
used to fund qualifying projects. First, the funds can only be 
used to finance projects that meet a set of agreed criteria. These 
criteria will both establish a principled basis for holding the IAs 
accountable for their use of the money and a predictable basis 
on which the PI can reject non-conforming project proposals. 
Second, the contract will oblige the IA to invest a stipulated 
amount of money over a number of years; however, the IA 
cannot access the funds until it provides the PI with a project 
proposal that complies with the terms of the contract. Once the 
PI approves the project, the fund manager will transfer the nec-
essary funds to a dedicated bank account controlled by the IAs 
and the PI. The funds will only be disbursed from this account 
for approved project related expenditures. Third, the contract 
will make clear that the IA is responsible for repaying, together 
with the stipulated interest rate, the funds advanced by the PI.
“Financial institutions, 
particularly those in poor 
countries, need to rethink 
their approach to business 
and social responsibility.”
iSSueS ariSing FroM the proJeCt
The Project raises a number of interesting issues that merit 
further investigation. First, the Project highlights the fact that 
most transitional justice efforts involving prosecutions and truth 
commissions focus on the relationship between the state and 
those who suffered under the old order. They only indirectly 
address the relations between the different social groupings that 
were involved in the conflict. It is not possible for a post-conflict 
society to achieve sustainable peace if these social groupings do 
not directly reconcile with each other. Consequently, there is a 
need to supplement the state’s transitional justice efforts with 
mechanisms that promote reconciliation between these non-state 
social groupings. The Project demonstrates that it is possible to 
use innovative applications of traditional financial instruments 
to promote reconciliation between the different groups within 
a post-conflict society. This is particularly important given that 
financial compensation has proven to be one of the most effec-
tive ways to promote reconciliation. 
Second, the Project demonstrates that it is possible to involve 
the expatriate elements of the different social groupings in these 
reconciliation efforts. Consequently, the bonds can become a 
useful way for a country to simultaneously raise funds from its 
local middle and upper classes and its diaspora.10 
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Third, the Project raises an interesting question about the 
nature of the investment approaches used by most financial 
institutions. The initiatives that the Project aims to support have 
difficulty raising funds because they do not meet either of the 
two usual sets of criteria that financial institutions use in mak-
ing their lending decisions — those used in commercial lending 
and those used in allocating their corporate social responsibility 
funds. As explained above, the projects to be funded by the 
R&D Bonds do not meet the criteria financial institutions use 
in extending credit on commercial terms. In addition, because 
they generate a stream of income, these projects are not viewed 
as attractive candidates for support from the donations that 
financial institutions make as part of their social responsibility. 
This suggests that financial institutions, particularly those in 
poor countries, need to rethink their approach to business and 
social responsibility. Instead of dividing all their investment 
activities into either one of these two categories, businesses 
should consider them as the two end-points of a spectrum of 
activities that range from profit maximizing activities at the one 
end to goodwill generating gifts at the other. The Project offers 
these institutions an opportunity to experiment and to learn more 
about how to identify other points along this spectrum. 
Fourth, the Project offers foundations and other grant makers 
the opportunity to learn about how they can support sub-com-
mercial revenue generating projects that produce jobs, services 
and opportunities for poor people. It should provide them with 
useful data on how they can adapt their grant making expertise 
to investing in these categories of development work. 
Fifth, the Project offers an opportunity to experiment with 
measuring the social returns generated by small-scale revenue-
generating development projects. Currently, there are not well 
established methodologies for measuring such returns. The 
Project proposes to provide each investor in the project with 
a detailed annual report on the investments being made by the 
IAs. These reports will inform investors about the social benefits 
that their investments are producing and hold the IAs and PI 
accountable for their use of the Bond proceeds. The empirical 
data that this generates can be used by interested parties to test 
methodologies for measuring social returns on investments. 
Such methodologies can help similar projects demonstrate that 
they are meeting the third reconciliation-financing criterion, 
namely that they are having a meaningful impact on poverty 
alleviation and development.
ConCluSion
the proJect Was originally conceived as a vehicle for 
promoting reconciliation, but it has evolved into an innovative 
reconciliation and development financing project. The Project, 
if successfully implemented, has the potential to be scaled up 
and to be replicated in a number of different countries and 
regions.                                                                           HRB
EnDnotEs: private FinanCe, SoCial reSponSiBility anD tranSitional JuStiCe
1 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report section 2, ch. 11 
(March 21, 2003), available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/ 
2003/trc/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
2 The lesson from the case of German reparations has been con-
firmed in a study of reparations in the Czech Republic. See Roman 
David & Susanne Choi Yuk-ping, Victims on Transnational 
Justice: Lessons from the Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in 
the Czech Republic, 27 human rights Quarterly 393 (2005).
3 Following the release of the TRC report, a group of South 
Africans established the “Home to All Campaign,” which estab-
lished a Development and Reconciliation Trust that accepted 
donations from the public and made grants to projects to promote 
literacy and other poverty-fighting efforts in South Africa. The 
Trust has collected some funds and has awarded some grants but 
the amounts were relatively small. The author worked with the 
Campaign and the Trust in developing this Project.  
4 David Everatt & Geetesh Solanki, A Nation of Givers: Social 
Giving among South Africans, The State of Social Giving in South 
Africa Report Series, Research Report No. 1.
5 The exchange rate between the South African Rand and the US 
Dollar fluctuates between about SAR 6-7.5 to USD 1. Thus R1  
billion is equal to about $143 million.
6 See Financial Sector Charter (2003), available at http://www.
banking.org.za/documents/2003/OCTOBER/Charter_Final.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2007). Under the Broad Based Economic 
Empowerment Act (53) 2003, all sectors of the South African  
economy are required to develop charters that establish standards, 
dealing with equity ownership, management, procurement, and 
investment, for transforming that sector so that it is more open 
to and representative of the whole South African population. 
Companies that fail to comply with these standards may be pre-
cluded from doing business with the government and may become 
less attractive to other private companies with whom they do busi-
ness (because of the implications for the latter group of companies’ 
own procurement requirements). The most relevant charter for the 
R&D Bonds project is the Financial Services Charter, which, inter 
alia, requires financial institutions to make significant investments 
in low income housing, small medium and micro-enterprises, and 
certain infrastructure projects that are designed to help develop  
previously underserved communities.
7 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s. 11(a). 
8 See National Treasury, Retail Savings Bonds, at www.rsaretail 
bonds.gov.za (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
9 The author, with the support of the Wallace Global Fund, has 
hired a consultant to identify the most suitable IAs. 
10 It should be noted that making the bonds available to the 
diaspora may raise securities law issues in their host countries. 
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